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Abstract—We examine a modified Naming Game in the mean field
where there are multiple degrees of ambivalence. Once an agent in
one state fears an opinion one way or another, he or she moves one
step in the appropriate direction. In the absence of zealots, the two
consensus states are stable steady states and the uniform distribution
is an unstable steady state. With zealots for one opinion only, there
is a critical value below which there are three steady states and
above which there is only one. Consensus in favor of the zealots’
opinion is the steady state that always exists, and is stable. The
second steady state is the uniform distribution in the absence of
zealots, and moves away from the zealots’ opinion as the number of
zealots increases. This state is unstable. The last steady state starts at
consensus against the zealots, and moves toward the zealots’ opinion
as the number of zealots increases. This state is stable. When zealots
are added on both sides, the ”beak” pattern observed for the Naming
Game remains, with the region of multiple steady states growing
with the addition of more intermediate states.
I. INTRODUCTION
The science of social interaction is a very alluring field. To
understand how humans influence each other provides the
opportunity to control how public opinion shapes itself. The
difficulty is that the human brain is too complex to allow
for a simple and clearly accurate model of human opinion
formation. As such, a number of approximations have been
proposed, each with its own shortcomings. Of interest is
the rather simple voter model. Here, each person, or agent,
has one of two conflicting opinions, A or B. As the agents
talk to each other, they try to convince each other of their
own opinions. One agent is chosen as the speaker and the
other is chosen as the listener. If the speaker and listener
agree, then there is no change in the opinion state, but if
they initially disagree, then the listener is converted to the
speaker’s opinion. [2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 17, 18] Of particular
interest is the parameter m, the magnetization of the system.
The magnetization is the expected poll result and is calculated
by ρA
ρA+ρB
, where ρA represents the density of people in favor
of opinion A and ρB represents the density of people in favor
of opinion B. Note that, for the voter model, ρA + ρB = 1. In
this case, the variables ρA and ρB are martingales, and given
enough time, the system will almost surely go to one of two
absorbing states, that of full consensus at A and that of full
consensus at B. [2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 18]
A more interesting model is the Naming Game model, or
Binary Agreement Model. Here, the possibility of ambivalence
is accounted for. In addition to the two extremist states A and
B, there is the state AB, which represents ambivalence. In this
model, agents in AB are no more or less likely to speak or be
spoken to than anyone else. If the chosen speaker is in the
ambivalent state, then he or she will subconsciously choose
one of the two opinions. If the listener is in the ambivalent
state, then he or she will change to whichever opinion he or
she hears. [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] While
there are various psychological studies on the effect of voicing
an opinion on an ambivalent speaker, this is ignored in the
Listener-Only Naming Game model. [4, 18] In this model, the
values ρA, ρB , and ρAB are no longer martingales. In fact,
once one side begins to dominate, (this dominance can be
determined by the magnetization, which is now calculated
by m = ρAB+2ρA
2
) this dominance will tend to grow until
consensus is reached. The consensus points are stable steady
states while perfect balance between ρA, ρB , and ρAB is an
unstable steady state. [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]
A further generalization allows for the agents to be leaning
in one direction or another to varying degrees without full
commitment to one idea or the other. If a listener hears
one opinion or the other, he or she moves one step in the
direction of the opinion he or she hears. [18] The parameter
K represents the number of times that an agent convinced of
opinion B needs to hear opinion A in order to be convinced
of opinion A, and vice versa. The population densities in
each state are now denoted ρ0, ρ1, ...ρK , where ρ0 represents
commitment to opinion B, ρK represents commitment to
opinion A, and the other states are the various ambivalent
states. The states themselves (as opposed to the populations of
the states,) are denoted N0, N1...NK . An agent in state Ni will
speak in favor of opinion A with probability i
K
and opinion B
with probability K−i
K
. Note that the Voter Model corresponds
to K = 1 and the Naming Game model corresponds to K = 2.
[18]
One other factor involved is the presence of zealots in favor
of one opinion of the other. A zealot operates with a motive that
ignores all logic and thus can never be convinced to change his
or her opinion. No amount of convincing can turn a non-zealot,
or normal agent, into a zealot. The presence of these zealots
affects the dynamics of the system as well as the possible long-
term outcomes. [1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18]
II. THE NO-ZEALOT CASE
The behavior of a network obeying one of these models can
be characterized by its long term behavior in the mean field.
That is to say, what possible steady-states are there and which
of them are stable. [20] It has already been shown that for the
standard Naming Game model, the two consensus points are
stable steady states and that the uniform distribution between
ρ0, ρ1, and ρ2 is an unstable steady state. [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] As it turns out, the analogous result is
true for any value of K ≥ 2. Namely, the state ρ0 = 1, ρi = 0
for i 6= 0 is a stable steady state, as is the state ρK = 1, ρi = 0
for i 6= K. The only other steady state is at ρi = 1K+1 for all i,
and this state is unstable.
The outline of the proof is as follows: It has been previously
shown that a necessary condition for a steady state is that
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2ρi
ρi−1 is constant (if finite,) for i = 1, 2...K. Furthermore, this
quotient is equal to m
1−m , where m is the magnetization, or
the expected poll result. The magnetization is calculated with
the formula m =
∑K
i=1(
i
K
× ρi). It can be shown that this is
a necessary and sufficient condition for a distribution to be a
steady state. Thus, selecting a value of m between 0 and 1 fully
determines the distribution by fixing the ratios of population
densities of different states. However, the distribution has a
magnetization of its own, and this may or may not be the
same as the magnetization used to generate the distribution. If
it is the same, then it is a steady state, otherwise it is not. It can
be shown that for m = 0, m = 0.5, and m = 1, the resulting
distribution has the same magnetization as the one used to
generate it. For 0 < m < 0.5, the resulting magnetization is
less than the value of m used to generate the distribution, and
for 0.5 < m < 1 the resulting magnetization is greater than
the one used to generate the distribution.
To address stability, we first look at the states corresponding
to m = 0 and m = 1. Because the setup exhibits symmetry,
we only need to show stability for one point, and the other
point should have the same level of stability. It should be noted
that the only distribution with m = 0 is ρ0 = 1, ρi = 0 for
i 6= 0. For distributions near this one, m tends to decrease over
time. Thus, the distributions tend toward the minimum value
of m, which is m = 0, and there is only one distribution with
that magnetization value. The point at m = 0.5 has a different
property. Assuming a geometric distribution with m slightly
greater than 0.5, the value of m will tend to increase, and if
m is slightly less than 0.5, m will tend to decrease. Thus, if
the distribution is slightly perturbed from the steady state, the
perturbation will grow larger and larger, resulting in instability.
A more detailed proof appears in the appendix.
III. STEADY STATES FOR THE UNILATERAL ZEALOT CASE
We now examine the case where, in addition to the normal
agents, there are agents with unshakable support for one
of the two opinions. We perform calculations assuming the
zealots support opinion B, and use symmetry to infer the
corresponding results for zealots in favor of opinion A. We
denote the population density of zealots in favor of opinion
B as ρB . It is worth mentioning that the notion of long-term
behavior takes on multiple meanings in this case. If there are
no zealots in favor of opinion A, but there is at least one in
favor of opinion B, then there is only one absorbing state,
namely, that of full consensus at opinion B. Furthermore, it
can be shown that this consensus state will be reached with
probability 1. [1, 3, 4, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] So in a
sense, the only truly stable steady state is that of consensus at
opinion B. However, it is realistically possible for the system
to hover in the neighborhood of a particular distribution for a
relatively long period of time before drifting to the consensus
state. [21, 22] It is these particular distributions which we are
looking for. We will call these opinion states ”metastable”
states. Additionally, we look for the conditions under which
these metastable states can exist.
In the case of the Voter Model, it is rather simple. The
magnetization is a supermartingale, with martingality holding
only for the consensus state. [3, 4, 9, 13, 17, 18] In the Naming
Game model, things get more interesting. Consensus at B is
always a stable steady state. It has been shown that in the
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Fig. 1. The values of ρB that will make a given value of m a steady
state for K = 2, 3, 4, and 10. Note that, in each case, the value of
ρB increases up to a point, then decreases. Thus, for each value of
ρB below a critical value, there will be exactly 2 steady states in the
interval [0.5, 1] and above this critical value, there will not be any
steady states in that interval.
case of ρB = 0, consensus at A is also a stable steady state,
and that this stable state drifts toward lower values of m as
ρB increases. This is also true for the case K = 3. Additionally,
when ρB = 0, the uniform distribution is an unstable steady
state. This unstable state moves to one of higher magnetization
as ρB increases. [3, 4, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21] This has also
been found to be true in the case K = 3. To understand why
this is, one needs to understand the relationship between
the magnetization m and the magnetization of the normal
agents, mnormal. We calculate the magnetization of the normal
agents by the formula mnormal =
∑K
i=1 i×rhoi
K×(1−ρB) . If we fix a
value of m and force the normal agents into a geometric
distribution obeying ρi
ρi−1 =
m
1−m , then the value of mnormal
is determined. It can be shown that the number of zealots
committed to opinion B can be determined from the formula
ρB = 1 − mmnormal As it turns out, the results regarding the
existence and metastability of steady states are true as long as
d2ρB
dm2
is of one sign over the interval (0.5, 1) and another over
the interval (0, 0.5). Figure 1 shows that this is the case for K
= 2, 3, 4, and 10. Figures 2-5 examine the stability of steady
states in the cases K = 3 and K = 10. The outline of the proof
is as follows:
Similar to the no-zealot case, a necessary condition for a
steady state is the relationship ρi
ρi−1 =
m
1−m . A subtle difference
between this case and the no-zealot case is that ρB is now a
parameter, and while it does not directly affect any of the ρi
values, it does directly affect m. In particular, as ρB increases,
m decreases. Thus, in cases where mnormal > m, there is a
suitable ρB that will enable the equation ρiρi−1 =
m
1−m to hold.
Recall the result that if a geometric distribution is generated
from a magnetization m then the resulting magnetization will
exceed the generating magnetization for 0.5 < m < 1. Thus,
for 0.5 < m < 1, there is a positive value of ρB that will make
the distribution steady. By symmetry, for 0 < m < 0.5, there is
a value of ρA that will make the distribution steady if ρB = 0.
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K = 3, m = 0.54
Fig. 2. Setting K = 3, we pick initial conditions with random small
perturbations off the intermediate steady state, and track the 2-norm
of d, the difference between the perturbed state and the true steady
state. Over the course of time, the difference tends to grow, showing
that the steady state is unstable.
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K = 3, m = 0.92
Fig. 3. Similar to figure 2, this time we take small perturbations off
the equilibrium state of highest magnetization. The difference always
decreases to 0, showing this equilibrium state to be stable.
It can be shown that this special value of ρB is unique and is
a continuous function of m. This means that, as long as the
special value of ρB is of one concavity as m varies, (in this
case, concave down,) the steady states will each move in one
direction as m increases. Because ρB is bounded by 0 and 1,
there must be some maximum value of ρB that yields a steady
state other than consensus at B. The continuity of ρB shows that
multiple steady states must meet at this maximum. Empirical
evidence suggests that the stability of these steady states does
not change until they meet at this critical value of ρB . A more
detailed proof appears in the appendix.
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K = 10, m = 0.509
Fig. 4. Similar to figure 2, but with K = 10 and the intermediate
steady state. Because the difference grows over time, the steady state
is unstable.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
x 10−3
time
|d|
2
K = 10, m = 0.944
Fig. 5. Similar to figure 3, but with K = 10 and the high-magnetization
steady state. Because the difference shrinks over time, the steady state
is stable.
IV. TIPPING POINTS FOR THE CASE OF BILATERAL ZEALOTS
As we have already mentioned, stability, and thus, long-term
sustainability of non-consensus states depends on the number
of zealots. This effect is even further pronounced when there
are not only zealots in favor of opinion B, but also in favor of
opinion A. [10, 11, 12, 17, 19] Examining the data in figures 6-
9, which examine the conditions under which multiple steady
states exist, several phenomena are noticed. First, if there are
sufficiently few committed agents total, there will be multiple
steady states. Second, if there are significantly more zealots
in favor of one opinion than the other, there is only a single
steady-state. Finally, if there are enough zealots, there will only
be one steady state. [10, 11, 12, 17, 19] This holds even when
the zealots are perfectly evenly divided between opinions A
and B. [11, 17, 19] This case is of particular interest, as it
implies that, given enough zealots, the equilibrium uniform
4Fig. 6. An analysis of which combinations of ρA and ρB result in
multiple steady states for K = 2. The dark region is where there is only
one steady state. Note the ”beak” shape consistent with [17]. Note that
when ρA = ρB , the dark region begins at (0.125, 0.125).
Fig. 7. Similar to figure 6, this graph analyzes the case of K = 3. The
”beak” shape remains, and the cusp of the dark region is at (0.20, 0.20).
distribution becomes a stable steady state. [10, 11, 12, 17, 19]
More interestingly, it becomes the only stable steady state, and
thus, given enough time, the system should always be near
this state.
We find the critical value of ρA and ρB above which the
uniform distribution of normal agents is stable. Let α represent
the fraction of agents who are not zealots. We also assume
that the system is near the uniform distribution. Because there
is little drift here, we can assume that the system is near a
geometric distribution, as the value of m would have been
approximately constant for a long time. Because the system
is nearly uniform, we assume r = 1 + . This gives us the
following equations:
Fig. 8. This graph analyzes the case K = 4. The cusp of the dark region
is now at (0.25, 0.25).
Fig. 9. This graph analyzes the case K = 10. The ”beak” pattern still
remains, and the cusp is at (0.375, 0.375).
ρi = ρ0(1 + )
i (1)
(2)
for i = 0, 1, 2...K
Note that, because  is small, (1 + )i ≈ 1 + i, giving us
ρi = ρ0(1 + i) (3)
(4)
for i = 0, 1, 2...K
To calculate m for this distribution, we can first calculate m
for the zealots, then calculate m for the normal agents, and take
a weighted average. Because the zealots are evenly distributed
between ρA and ρB , we know that, for this group of zealots,
mzealots = 0.5. For the normal agents, the calculation is more
involved.
5mnormal =
∑K
i=0
i+i2
K
K + 1 + K
2+K
2

(5)
Evaluating the sum, and using the formula for the sum of
squares, we get
mnormal =
K+1
2
+ K(K+1)(2K+1)
6K

K + 1 + K
2+K
2

(6)
Factoring out a K+1 from the numerator and denominator,
expanding in powers of epsilon, and dropping everything after
the linear term, we get
mnormal =
0.5 + (2K+1)
6

1 + K
2

(7)
mnormal = (0.5 +
(2K + 1)
6
)(1− K
2
) (8)
mnormal = (0.5 + (
K + 2
12
)) (9)
To find the overall value of m, we take a weighted average
of mnormal and mzealots.
m = αmnormal + (1− α)mzealots (10)
m = α(0.5 + (
K + 2
12
)) + (1− α)(0.5) (11)
m = 0.5 + α
K + 2
12
(12)
Next, to check for stability, we calculate E[ dm
dt
]. When this
figure has the same sign as , the equilibrium state is unstable,
and when it has the opposite sign, the uniform distribution is
stable.
E[
dm
dt
] = m(1− ρK)− (1−m)(1− ρ0) (13)
= (0.5 + α
K + 2
12
)(1− 1 +K
K + 1 + K
2+K
2
) (14)
− (0.5− αK + 2
12
)(1− 1−K
K + 1 + K
2+K
2
)
Expanding in powers of  and dropping everything after the
linear terms, we get
E[
dm
dt
] = (0.5 + α
K + 2
12
)(1− 1
K + 1
− K
2
) (15)
− (0.5− αK + 2
12
)(1− 1
K + 1
+
K
2
)
= (−K
4
+ α
K2 + 2K
12K + 12
)− (K
4
− αK
2 + 2K
12K + 12
) (16)
= (−2K
4
+ 2α
K2 + 2K
12K + 12
) (17)
Note that the uniform distribution is stable whenever K
4
−
αK
2+2K
12K+12
> 0. As a result, we get
α <
K
4
K2+2K
12K+12
(18)
α <
3
K + 2
(19)
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Fig. 10. The graph of the difference between the highest and lowest
values of m for which a steady state exists in the case where ρA = ρB .
For values of ρA and ρB slightly below the critical value, the difference
is still fairly high.
Figure compares this analytical result to numerical results for
K = 2, 3, and 4. As can be seen, the analytics and the numerics
agree. It should be noted that the discrepancy between the
highest and lowest values of m corresponding to equilibrium
states is relatively high for values of α even only slightly higher
than the critical value of 3
K+2
.
APPENDIX A
DETAILED MATHEMATICAL PROOFS
In the case without zealots, ρA = ρB = 0. Let the distribution
of agents in the various opinion states be represented by
the K+1 dimensional vector [ρ0, ρ1, ...ρK ]. Let m represent the
magnetization of this distribution. Assume the distribution to
be a steady state. Let φi+ be the expected flux over one time
step from state Ni to state Ni + 1. This is, by definition, the
expected number of listeners in state i who hear opinion A. We
define a time step such that one conversation occurs per unit
time. The probability that a listener is in state i is simply ρi.
The probability that a listener hears opinion A is roughly the
same for all potential listeners, (assuming a sufficiently large
complete network,) and is equal to the magnetization. Thus,
we have
φi+ = m× ρi (20)
for i = 0, 1, 2...K−1. φK+ = 0 because there is no state NK+1
for the agents to move into. Similarly, we can define φi− as the
expected flux from state Ni to state Ni−1. We have
φi− = (1−m)× ρi (21)
If a distribution is a steady state, the flux from state Ni to
state Ni+1 must be matched by the flux from state Ni+1 to state
Ni. Thus, we have the equations
6φ(i+1)− = φi+ (22)
(1−m)× ρi+1 = m× ρi (23)
ρi+1
ρi
=
m
1−m (24)
for m 6= 1. The special cases of m = 0 and m = 1 are the
absorbing states, and are clearly steady states. The case m = 0.5
produces a steady state. In this case
ρi+1
ρi
=
0.5
0.5
= 1 (25)
ρi+1 = ρi (26)
Because all K+1 population densities are equal and they sum
to 1, we have ρi = 1K+1 for all i. The only question is whether
or not the magnetization of the resulting distribution is, in fact,
0.5.
m =
∑K
i=1 i× ρi
K
(27)
m =
∑K
i=1 i× 1K+1
K
(28)
m =
K×(K+1)
2
× 1
K+1
K
(29)
m = 0.5 (30)
Because the distribution is geometric and the resulting mag-
netization is equal to the magnetization used to generate the
distribution, it is a steady state. Thus, steady states are achieved
for the geometric distributions generated by magnetizations of
0, 0.5, and 1.
In the case where 0 < m < 0.5, when m is used to generate a
distribution and K ≥ 2, the resulting magnetization is strictly
less than the one used to generate the distribution, and the
when 0.5 < m < 1, the resulting magnetization is strictly
greater than the one used to generate the distribution. This
means that, in either case, the distribution is not a steady state
as the ratio ρi+1
ρi
6= m
1−m . The proof is shown for the case
0.5 < m < 1 and an analogous proof can be used for the
case 0 < m < 0.5.
Suppose K = 1. Let ρ0 = 1−x and ρ1 = x. The magnetization
of this distribution is
m = 1× x = x (31)
and the ratio of adjacent states is
ρ1
ρ0
=
x
1− x =
m
1−m (32)
Thus, for K = 1, any geometric distribution is a steady state.
If K is increased by 1 and the same ratio x
1−x between adjacent
states and 0.5 < x < 1, then the value of m for the new
distribution is strictly greater than the value of m for the
distribution with a lower value of K.
Consider a geometric distribution on K+1 states with ρ1
ρ0
=
x
1−x . Suppose this distribution has magnetization mold. Sup-
pose that this distribution is extended to K+2 states by keeping
the values of ρ0, ρ1...ρK and setting ρK+1 = ρK × x1−x . We
calculate the magnetization of the new distribution, mnew.
mnew =
∑K+1
i=1 (iρi)∑K+1
i=0 ρi
(33)
mnew =
K
K+1
mold
∑K
i=0 ρi + ρK+1∑K+1
i=0 ρi
(34)
mnew = mold +
−1
K+1
mold
∑K
i=0 ρi + (1−mold)ρK+1∑K+1
i=0 ρi
(35)
We examine the sign of −1
K+1
×mold ∗
∑K
i=0 ρi + 1−mold ×
ρK+1. Note that, because of the ratio
ρi+1
ρi
= x
1−x and the
restrictions taken on x, ρK must be greater than any of the
other values of ρi. Thus, ρK >
∑K
i=0 ρi
K+1
, so ρK+1 >
x×∑Ki=0 ρi
(1−x)(K+1) .
In the case K = 1, we have mold = x and we will show,
by induction, that for K ≥ 2, mold ≥ x, which gives us
ρK+1 >
mold×
∑K
i=0 ρi
(1−mold)(K+1) .
mnew = mold +
−1
K+1
mold
∑K
i=0 ρi + (1−mold)ρK+1∑K+1
i=0 ρi
(36)
mnew > mold +
−1
K+1
mold
∑K
i=0 ρi +
mold
1−mold (1−mold)
∑K
i=0 ρi
K+1∑K+1
i=0 ρi
(37)
mnew > mold +
∑K
i=0 ρi∑K+1
i=0 ρi
× mold
−1
K+1
+ 1
K+1∑K+1
i=0 ρi
(38)
mnew > mold (39)
Because mnew > mold and mold ≥ x1−x we have mnew > x1−x
so the magnetization of the new distribution is not equal to
x
1−x , so the distribution is not a steady state. Note that this
inequality also validates the induction used earlier.
Having found the steady states, we examine their stability.
Consider the state of consensus at B. The vector of popu-
lation densities is [1, 0, 0, ...0]. Note that, because the sum
of population densities must equal 1, we can determine the
distribution from the vector [ρ1, ρ2, ...ρK ]. For consensus at B,
this is [0, 0, ...0]. Assume that the initial condition is a slight
perturbation from consensus, and [ρ1, ρ2, ...ρK ] = [1, 2, ...K ].
Consider the ”magnetization norm” ||x||m = (1/K)(|x1| +
2|x2|+...+K|xK |). First, we show that this quantity is, in fact, a
norm. Because it is a sum of absolute values, it is nonnegative,
and 0 only when each component is 0.
||c× x||m = |c× x1|+ 2|c× x2|+ ...+K|c× xK |
K
(40)
=
|c| × |x1|+ 2|c| × |x2|+ ...+K|c| × |xK |
K
(41)
= |c|||x||m (42)
||x+ y||m = |x1 + y1|+ 2|x2 + y2|+ ...+K|xK + yK |
K
(43)
≤ |x1|+ |y1|+ ...+K|xK |+K|yK |
K
(44)
= ||x||m + ||y||m (45)
Next, note that for realizable distributions, xi ≥ 0, so the
absolute value bars can be ignored. Thus, ||x||m = (1/K)(x1 +
2(x2) + ... + K(xK)) = m. At consensus, ||x||m = 0. We
examine what happens in a neighborhood of consensus such
that ||x||m ≤ 12KN . Note that this means that ρi = 0 for i > K/2
and that ρ0 ≤ 1− 2m. We examine ∆m, the change in m over
a single time step.
7∆m =
mρ0 + (2m− 1)(1− ρ0)
NK
(46)
≤ m(1− 2m) + (2m− 1)(1− (1− 2m))
NK
(47)
=
m− 2m2 + (4m2 − 2m)
NK
(48)
=
−m+ 2m2 + (4m2 − 2m)
NK
(49)
< 0 (50)
for 0 < m < 0.5. Thus, the value of ||x||m will decrease, and
the point is stable. An analogous argument holds for the point
of consensus at A.
Next, we examine the stability of the uniform distribution. In
a sufficiently small neighborhood of this distribution, none of
the population densities are 0. This allows us to describe the
distribution with the vector of ratios of densities of adjacent
states, [ ρ1
ρ0
, ρ2
ρ1
, ρ3
ρ2
... ρK
ρK−1 ]. For the uniform distribution, this
vector is [1, 1, 1...1]. Assume a small perturbation of the form
[, , ...], so that the vector is [1 + , 1 + ...1 + ], where
 > 0. We claim that if the minimum ratio of densities of
adjacent states is some rmin(t) > 1, then after one time step,
the minimum ratio of densities is some rmin(t+ 1) > rmin(t).
Let’s first examine the ratio ρi+1
ρi
for i = 1, 2, ...K − 2. We
fix ρi and attempt to minimize
ρi+1
ρi
(t + 1). Suppose that
ρi+1 > rmin(t)(ρi). Then, for sufficiently large N, ρi+1 and ρi
would change sufficiently little to keep ρi+1
ρi
(t+1) > rmin(t). If
ρi+1 = rmin(t)(ρi), we attempt to minimize
ρi+1
ρi
(t+ 1). To do
this, we minimize ρi+1(t + 1) and maximize ρi(t + 1). This
is achieved by minimizing ρi+2(t) and maximizing ρi−1(t).
Obeying the constraint that ρi+1
ρi
≥ rmin(t), we get
ρi−1(t) ≤ ρi(t)
rmin(t)
(51)
ρi(t) = ρi(t) (52)
ρi+1(t) = ρi(t)× rmin(t) (53)
ρi+2(t) ≥ ρi(t)× (rmin(t))2 (54)
The new values of the relevant densities are
ρi(t+ 1) = ρi(t) ∗ (N − 1
N
) + ρi−1(t)×m(1/N)
+ρi+1(t)× (1−m)(1/N) (55)
ρi+1(t+ 1) = ρi+1(t) ∗ (N − 1
N
) + ρi(t)×m(1/N)
+ρi+2(t)× (1−m)(1/N) (56)
The quotient of these terms is
ρi+1(t+ 1)
ρi(t+ 1)
=
ρi+1(t)(
N−1
N
) + ρi(t)m(1/N) + ρi+2(t)(1−m)(1/N)
ρi(t)(
N−1
N
) + ρi−1(t)m(1/N) + ρi+1(t)(1−m)(1/N)
(57)
≥ ρi(t)(rmin(t)(
N−1
N
) +m(1/N) + rmin(t)
2(1−m)(1/N))
ρi(t)((
N−1
N
) + m
Nrmin(t)
+ rmin(t)(1−m)(1/N))
(58)
= rmin(t) (59)
Thus, the if the minimum ratio of densities of adjacent
opinion states decreases, it must involve one of the extreme
states. We examine the case i = 0. Similar to before, we have
ρ0(t) = ρ0(t) (60)
ρ1(t) = ρ0(t)× rmin(t) (61)
ρ2(t) ≥ ρ0(t)× (rmin(t))2 (62)
(63)
The new values of the relevant densities are
ρ0(t+ 1) = ρ0(t) ∗ (N −m
N
)
+ρ1(t)× (1−m)(1/N) (64)
ρ1(t+ 1) = ρ1(t) ∗ (N − 1
N
)
+ρ0(t)×m(1/N) + ρ2(t)× (1−m)(1/N) (65)
(66)
The quotient of these terms is
ρ1(t+ 1)
ρ0(t+ 1)
=
ρ1(t)(
N−1
N
) + ρ0(t)
m
N
+ ρ2(t)(1−m)(1/N)
ρ0(t)(
N−m
N
) + ρ1(t)(1−m)(1/N)
(67)
≥ ρ0(t)(rmin(t)(
N−1
N
) +m(1/N) + rmin(t)
2(1−m)(1/N))
ρ0(t)((
N−m
N
) + rmin(t)(1−m)(1/N))
(68)
The numerator of this fraction is a special case of the numer-
ator of equation 58. The denominator differs by an additive
term of (ρ0(t))× ( −mN×rmin(t) +
1−m
N
). Because rmin(t) > 1, we
have
m
1−m > rmin(t) (69)
m
rmin(t)
> 1−m (70)
m
N × rmin(t) >
1−m
N
(71)
−m
N × rmin(t) +
1−m
N
< 0 (72)
Thus, the denominator is smaller, so the quotient is larger,
and we have
ρ1(t+ 1)
ρ0(t+ 1)
> rmin(t) (73)
Finally, we examine the case where i = K − 1.
ρK−2(t) ≤ ρK − 1(t)
rmin(t)
(74)
ρK−1(t) = ρK − 1(t) (75)
ρK(t) = ρK − 1(t)× rmin(t) (76)
The new values of the relevant densities are
ρK − 1(t+ 1) = ρK − 1(t) ∗ (N − 1
N
) +
ρK−2(t)×m(1/N) + ρK(t)× (1−m)(1/N) (77)
ρK(t+ 1) = ρK(t) ∗ (N − 1 +m
N
) +
ρK−1(t)×m(1/N) (78)
Comparing this quotient to equation 64, we find that the
denominator can be factored into the same form, but the
numerator has an additive constant of ρK×(mN − (1−m)×(rmin)N )
8Again, we have
m
1−m > rmin(t) (79)
m > (1−m)× rmin(t) (80)
m
N
>
(1−m)× rmin(t)
N
(81)
m
N
− (1−m)× rmin(t)
N
> 0 (82)
Thus, the numerator is greater and the denominator is the
same as in equation 58, so the quotient is greater. Again, we
have
ρK(t+ 1)
ρK−1(t+ 1)
> rmin(t) (83)
Thus, rmin(t) in this case is a non-decreasing function of t,
so it will never drop back down to 1. The uniform distribution
is unstable.
In the case of unilateral zealots, either ρA = 0 or ρB = 0.
For simplicity, we assume ρA = 0 and infer the corresponding
results for ρB = 0 by symmetry. The distribution of agents in
each non-zealot opinion state must still be geometric, so for
fixed ρB we can determine the distribution by the parameter
m. Note that, given a distribution of normal agents and zealots,
we have the relation
m = mnormal(1− ρB − ρA) +mzealots(ρA + ρB) (84)
Note that, in the case where ρA = 0, mzealots = 0, so the
equation reduces to
m = mnormal(1− ρB) (85)
In the case without zealots, we know that the only values
of m which yield steady states are 0, 0.5, and 1. The question
now arises, for other values of m is there a value of ρB such
that there is a steady state with that value of m. We solve for
any value of ρB that would make this possible.
m = mnormal(1− ρB) (86)
m = mnormal −mnormalρB (87)
ρB =
mnormal −m
mnormal
(88)
We have the added restrictions that 0 ≤ ρB ≤ 1. This can be
achieved whenever mnormal −m ≥ 0. As we have previously
shown, this occurs whenever 0 < m < 0.5. Thus, for those
values of m there exists a unique ρB such that equilibrium
exists at that particular m. This is consistent with what has
been shown in the case K = 2. In that particular case, it was
found that for sufficiently small ρB there were three values of
m where equilibrium was achieved. One was consensus at B.
The others started at m = 0.5 and m = 1 and as ρB increased,
the corresponding equilibrium values of m approached each
other. At some critical value of ρB , the equilibrium states meet,
and above that critical value, they vanish, and only the one
equilibrium point, (consensus at B,) remains. This will occur if
d2ρB
dm2
< 0 over the interval (0.5, 1).
The state of consensus at B can be shown to be stable using
the aforementioned magnetization norm. Again, examine the
neighborhood of consensus such that ||x||m < 12KN .
∆m =
m(ρ0 + ρB) + (2m− 1)(1− ρ0 − ρB)
NK
(89)
≤ m(1− 2m) + (2m− 1)(1− (1− 2m))
NK
(90)
=
m− 2m2 + (4m2 − 2m)
NK
(91)
=
−m+ 2m2 + (4m2 − 2m)
NK
(92)
< 0 (93)
over the interval (0, 0.5), showing that the point is stable.
assuming that the pattern of three equilibrium points for
sufficiently small ρB holds, it can be shown that the middle one
is unstable. Note that, under these assumptions, the value of ρB
needed to maintain equilibrium increases as m increases. Thus,
as m increases and is used to generate a geometric distribution,
the resulting value of m will be greater than the one used to
generate the distribution. (It should be noted that in the case
of the last equilibrium point, the opposite is true.) Because the
quantities ρ0, ρ1... are nonzero, and because the value of ρB
is fixed, we can determine the distribution (and any others
near it,) with the vector [r1, r2, ...rK ], where ri = ρiρi−1 . At
equilibrium, there is a magnetization value meq , and the vector
of density ratios is [ m
1−m ,
m
1−m ,
m
1−m , ...
m
1−m ]. We assume that
the initial state is perturbed slightly from the equilibrium state,
and the vector of density ratios is now [ m
∗
1−m∗ ,
m∗
1−m∗ , ...
m∗
1−m∗ ],
where m∗ = meq + . We assume that if the minimum value
of the ratio of densities of adjacent opinion states is no less
than m
∗
1−m∗ , then after one time step the minimum ratio will
still be no less than m
∗
1−m∗ , near enough the equilibrium point.
Consider the ratio between two ambivalent states. Just like the
case without zealots, we get
ρi(t+ 1) = ρi(t) ∗ (N − 1
N
) + ρi−1(t)×m(1/N)
+ρi+1(t)× (1−m)(1/N) (94)
ρi+1(t+ 1) = ρi+1(t) ∗ (N − 1
N
) + ρi(t)×m(1/N)
+ρi+2(t)× (1−m)(1/N) (95)
And the quotient is still bounded from below by m
∗
1−m∗ .
Let’s consider the ratio between ρ1 and ρ0. Because of the
assumption on the distribution, ρ1 ≥ m∗ρ01−m∗ . As before, the only
way that the ratio could be smaller than m
∗
1−m∗ after one time
step for sufficiently large N is if ρ1 = m
∗ρ0
1−m∗ . Furthermore, recall
that ρ2 ≥ m∗ρ11−m∗ . The ratio of ρ1 to ρ0 after one time step is
ρ1(t+ 1)
ρ0(t+ 1)
=
ρ1(t)(
N−1
N
) + ρ0(t)(m/N) + ρ2(t)(1−m)(1/N)
ρ0(t)(
N−m
N
) + ρ1(t)(1−m)(1/N)
(96)
≥ ρ0(t)(
m∗
1−m∗ ∗ (N−1N ) +m(1/N) + m
∗
1−m∗
2 × (1−m)(1/N))
ρ0(t)((
N−m
N
) + m∗
1−m∗ × (1−m)(1/N))
(97)
Note that, for the greater value of m, a greater value of
ρB is needed to bring equilibrium. Thus, if m∗ is above the
equilibrium value, than the value of m of the distribution
generated by m∗ is greater than m∗. With this, and logic similar
to the no-zealot case, it can be shown that the ratio of ρ1 to
ρ0 will remain above m
∗
1−m∗ . An analogous argument holds for
the ratio of ρK to ρK−1. Thus, the point is unstable.
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